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ISSUES OF LAW AND POLITICAL WILL
Jelena Pejic*
INTRODUCTION
Fifty years after the commencement of trial proceedings in
Nuremberg, the international community finally seems to be in-
terested, although not yet wholeheartedly committed, to the cre-
ation of an International Criminal Court ("ICC" or "Court"). An
item entitled the "Establishment of an International Criminal
Court" has been included in the provisional agenda of the forth-
coming fiftieth United Nations General Assembly session. While
it seems unlikely that the ICC will be set up in 1995, it appears
that the issue has at least been broached in a major way. Among
the many factors contributing to this development that deserve
to be noted, three seem to merit particular mention: (1) the
end of the Cold War; (2) the establishment of ad hoc tribunals
for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations
of international humanitarian law committed in the former Yu-
goslavia and, later, in Rwanda; and (3) the recent dedicated and
expeditious work of the International Law Commission ("ILC"),
entrusted with the task of drafting the ICC's Statute.
Upon request of the U.N. General Assembly, the ILC in
1993 produced a Draft Statute for an International Criminal
Court ("Draft Statute") and upon receipt of comments from gov-
ernments drafted a Revised Draft Statute for the proposed Court
in 1994. It simultaneously recommended that the General As-
sembly convene an international conference of plenipotentiaries
to study the Revised Draft Statute and to conclude a convention
on the establishment of the Court. As of April 1995, the Revised
Draft is being debated before an ad hoc Committee of the Gen-
eral Assembly. If the need arises, the Committee will meet once
again, in the second half of August 1995, before the start of the
General Assembly's anniversary session.
While the ILC has been, quite correctly, widely credited for
having produced a thoughtful and detailed document, there are
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still plenty of issues over which governments, non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs"), and experts, to mention just a few, con-
tinue to disagree. The differences can, in the most general
terms, be categorized as those primarily political in nature and
those related to essentially legal problems. As for the first group,
states' cautiousness vis A vis the establishment of an International
Criminal Court stems from the fact that such a court would, of
necessity, present another encroachment on their sovereignty,
which is something they are unwilling to accede to. NGOs, on
the other hand, particularly those concerned with human rights,
want to see an effective International Criminal Court and, to that
end, advocate mechanisms that states are still reluctant to ac-
cept. As regards experts, they may be found on either side of
this broadly sketched divide. It is, in any event, against this back-
drop that legal issues unresolved in the Revised Draft Statute
need to be considered. In this Essay, an attempt will be made to
briefly highlight a few of these issues.
I. PERMANENCE OF THE COURT
Under the Revised Draft Statute, the ICC is envisaged as a
permanent body, but not one that will, at least initially, function
on a full-time basis. As a result, and with several exceptions,
judges will not be precluded from holding other salaried posi-
tions. It must be mentioned, however, that Article 10 of the Re-
vised Draft Statute does provide for the operation of the Court
on a full-time basis if its workload were to so require. However,
regardless of the fact that the ILC took pains to enable the ICC's
possible transformation from a non-standing permanent body to
a full-time organ, it remains unclear why full-time work was not
anticipated from the start. Critics of the current text point out
that permanence would both enhance the Court's stature and
ensure the requisite independence and impartiality of its judges.
II. COMPLAINT PROCEDURE AND POSITION OF THE
PROSECUTOR
Taking into account states' sensitivity to having their nation-
als potentially tried before an international criminal jurisdiction,
the Revised Draft Statute adopts a restrictive approach as to who
may lodge complaints. Pursuant to Article 25, the Court is only
open to states, parties, and, in certain cases, to the U.N. Security
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Council. In other words, the Prosecutor has no power of initiat-
ing proceedings ex officio or on the basis of petitions submitted
by other sources such as inter-governmental organizations,
NGOs, or individuals. Thus, victims of crimes over which the
ICC has jurisdiction have no standing to bring cases before the
Court. Given, among other things, the expected reluctance of
states to lodge complaints against nationals of other states, there
seems to be a reasonable fear that many of the crimes the Court
is meant to deal with will continue to go unpunished. In addi-
tion, it should be mentioned that the Prosecutor of the ad hoc
Tribunal for the 'former Yugoslavia, regardless of the different
method of its creation, has been entrusted with the authority to
initiate investigations both ex officio and on the basis of informa-
tion received from any source.
III. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Since the beginning of work on the Draft Statute, the ICC's
subject-matter jurisdiction has been the subject of strenuous de-
bate. According to Article 20, the Court is competent to try per-
sons suspected of genocide, aggression, serious violations of the
laws and customs applicable in armed conflict, crimes against
humanity, and crimes specified in treaties listed in the Annex to
the Statute that constitute exceptionally serious crimes of inter-
national concern. Among the many varied positions taken with
regard to the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction the two most di-
vergent deserve to be mentioned. At one end is the view that the
ICC's inherent jurisdiction, such as is provided for over the
crime of genocide, should be expanded to include serious viola-
tions of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflict and
crimes against humanity (the crime of aggression will be dealt
with shortly). At the other end is the conviction that the U.N.
Security Council, and therefore not even individual states,
should have the sole authority to determine whether cases in-
volving genocide, serious violations of the laws and customs ap-
plicable in armed conflict, and crimes against humanity should
be heard by the Court. Treaty-based crimes have also been the
cause of intense deliberations. While some governments favor
excluding treaties on drug-trafficking and terrorism from the
Annex to the Revised Draft Statute, other commentators would
not only broaden the list of treaty-based crimes, but would also
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leave room for the Court's subsequent assumption of jurisdic-
tion over offenses provided for in the ILC's Draft Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, a very con-
troversial document, to say the least.
IV. AGGRESSION
Linked to the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction is the way
in which proceedings against, individuals responsible for the
crime of aggression are regulated. Article 23 of the Revised
Draft Statute provides that a complaint of or directly related to
an act of aggression may not be brought under the Statute un-
less the Security Council has first determined that a state has
committed an act of aggression which is the subject of the com-
plaint. According to critics, the inclusion of the crime of aggres-
sion is problematic because the very nature of that offense re-
quires a determination that is entirely political in character.
What constitutes an act of aggression, it is pointed out, has not
yet been defined as a matter of law. It is therefore unclear
whether in trying an individual the Court would have judicial
review of a determination made by the Security Council. If it
would not, the reasoning goes, the sole question for the Court
would be to decide whether a person bears responsibility for an
act of state deemed illegal. Finally, it needs to be stressed that
recent difficulties in determining whether particular armed con-
flicts are international or internal in character will most likely
compound problems if and when attempts at defining aggres-
sion are undertaken.
V. REERRAL OF CASES BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Article 23 of the Revised Draft Statute also provides that the
Court would have jurisdiction over the crimes it is empowered to
adjudicate under Article 20 as a consequence of the referral of a
matter to the Court by the Security Council acting under Chap-
ter VII of the U.N. Charter. The authority of the Security Coun-
cil to institute proceedings before the Court has generally not
been disputed. There is a widespread realization that if the Se-
curity Council were barred from doing so, many serious crimes
would never be prosecuted if the only other option was to de-
pend on individual state discretion. There is a lingering con-
cern, however, as to how this provision will be interpreted and
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therefore, it appears that there is a need for clarification. The
principal dilemma is whether the Security Council is only au-
thorized to refer "matters" to the Court, meaning that it would
then be the responsibility of the Prosecutor to establish which
individuals should be charged under Article 20 in relation to
that "matter," or whether the Security Council can also refer in-
dividual cases to the Court. In its Commentary to Article 23 the
ILC took the position that the Security Council would not nor-
mally (emphasis added) refer to the Court a case in the sense of
allegations against named individuals. It is, however, precisely
this vagueness that worries human rights NGOs and experts, par-
ticularly as the Security Council's reading of this provision re-
mains to be seen.
VI. CONSENT TO JURISDICTION
Similar to the mechanism adopted in the Statute of the In-
ternational Court of Justice, the fact that a state becomes a party
to the ICC's Statute does not confer automatic jurisdiction on
the Court. Article 21 of the Revised Draft Statute spells out
which states have to accept the Court's jurisdiction with regard
to the crimes within its ambit, whereas Article 22 defines the
modes of such acceptance. Generally, acceptance is effected by
a special declaration that may be of general or limited applica-
tion, made for a specified or unspecified period of time.
With the exception of the Court's inherent jurisdiction over
genocide, which means that consent is considered given when a
state becomes a party to the ICC's Statute, it transpires that in
any other case, in order for proceedings to take place, the
Court's jurisdiction must be accepted both by the state that has
custody of a suspect (the custodial state) and by the state in
whose territory the crime involved was committed. In addition,
if the custodial state has received an extradition request from
another state, unless the request is rejected, the acceptance of
the Court's jurisdiction with respect to the crime in question by
the requesting state is also mandated. It can be concluded that
Article 21 essentially determines the supplementary nature of
the Court's jurisdiction and therefore the cause of its potential
(in) effectiveness.
While it should be admitted that the ILC laudably disre-
garded demands to have' the consent of an offender's state of
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nationality added to those whose acceptance of jurisdiction in a
specific case must be obtained, it is also clear that the Revised
Draft Statute did not meet calls for enhancing the ICC's author-
ity. Proponents of this view believe that the Court should be
able to proceed as long as the custodial state has accepted its
jurisdiction over a specific crime, regardless of the consent of
other states. It can therefore be expected that this issue will also
be the subject of further debate.
VII. TRIALS IN ABSENTIA
Under Article 37 of the current text, individuals accused of
crimes provided for in the Court's Statute are "as a general rule"
to be tried in their presence. Trials in absentia would be permit-
ted in the following situations: if the accused is in custody or has
been released pending trial and for reasons of security or ill-
health it is undesirable for him/her to be present; if the accused
is continuing to disrupt the proceedings; or if the accused has
escaped from lawful custody or has broken ball. A question that
immediately arises upon review of the relevant provisions is why
are trials in absentia before the ICC under the specified circum-
stances allowed and, at the same time, not permitted under the
Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for identical crimes?
Why wasn't a comparable procedure adopted, whereby in the
absence of the accused there would be no trial, but instead, an
open court session at which the indictment would be read and
the relevant evidence presented? In this context, it has been
pointed out that, if at all, trials in absentia before the ICC could
be deemed acceptable only if the accused has deliberately re-
moved himself or herself by escaping from lawful custody or by
breaking bail. In the other situations enumerated, it is thought
that such trials would be unjust, especially as measures to secure
the presence of an accused. Instead, the proceedings could be
merely delayed in cases of illness and security checks could be
conducted and bullet-proof glass could be put in place where
threats against the accused could be undertaken. There are,
however, also opposing views on this question, with calls for
broadening the Court's authority to try absent individuals.
Whatever the outcome may be, it should be noted that the Re-
vised Draft Statute does not provide for de novo trials where a
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judgment has been rendered in absence. This seems to be a re-
grettable omission.
CONCLUSION
As stated earlier, the primary purpose of this brief review
was to draw attention to some unresolved issues related to the
establishment of an ICC. It can be said that, at this stage, with
the ILC having fulfilled its task, it is up to states to finally make a
decision on a crucial point: are they truly committed to creating
an (effective) International Criminal Court? Provided the polit-
ical will to do so exists, strictly legal issues could, undoubtedly,
be more easily resolved.
